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CHANCELLOR v. LAWRENCE*
MINIMUM CONTACTS AND THE
FIDUCIARY SHIELD DOCTRINE
Traditionally, in personam jurisdiction' was premised on a
state's physical control over its territory. In the landmark case
of Pennoyer v. Neff, 2 the United States Supreme Court held that
the exercise of jurisdiction over any defendant required personal service of process while the defendant was within the territorial boundaries of the forum. 3 Because the defendant's
presence 4 within the forum was virtually the sole basis 5 for ac* 501 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
1. Jurisdiction, the power to decide a case or controversy, is comprised
of two elements: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter, the power to decide the kind of case before the court; and (2) jurisdiction over the person
(in personam), the power to decide a case between the parties before the
court. Since a plaintiff submits himself to the court's power, the problem
with in personam jurisdiction is obtaining the power to bind the defendant.
D. KARLEN, CIVIL LITIGATION 4-7 (1978). The term "jurisdiction," as used in
this casenote, refers only to in personam jurisdiction.
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court affirmed an Oregon Appellate Court decision refusing to enter a default judgment against a
nonresident defendant who was not personally served with summons.
3. "[T]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established." Id. at 720.
4. "Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person.
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him." International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Although no longer the
primary basis for in personam jurisdiction, the concept of presence is still a
factor in jurisdictional considerations. "A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its territory,
whether permanently or temporarily." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1971). The temporary presence of a nonresident within
a forum has been held sufficient for the acquisition of jurisdiction. E.g.,
Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (service on an airplane flying over the forum held valid on the theory of presence); Darrah v.
Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1873) (personal jurisdiction exercised over nonresident in the forum on business for only a few hours). But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (unfair to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant's
property within the forum when the defendant himself did not have sufficient contacts with the forum). Although dealing with quasi in rem jurisdiction, Shaffer suggests that temporary presence at the time of service may be
insufficient to constitutionally confer personal jurisdiction.
5. In Pennoyer, the Court held that jurisdiction could be conferred by
the defendant's consent either given in advance or given after commencement of the action by the defendant's appearance in court to contest on the
merits. 95 U.S. at 735.
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quiring jurisdiction, a plaintiff's ability to bring an action against
6
a nonresident was curtailed.
Since Pennoyer, however, there has been a steady growth in
the state's ability 7 to acquire jurisdiction. Despite the require-

ments of due process,8 retreat from the Pennoyer concept of
physical presence has significantly increased the nonresident's
amenability to suit.9 This modification is a judicial response to
the modernization of society. As technology advanced and mobility increased, so did the defendant's vulnerability to
process.10
The trend of expanding personal jurisdiction over nonresidents began with scattered exceptions to the presence oriented
doctrine of Pennoyer.11 Jurisdiction based on such factors as
the defendant's domicile, business activity, or consent, made
6. Since a state's control ended at its territorial borders, Pennoyer held
that "[p]rocess from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another
State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them." Id. at 727. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90 (1917) (personal judgment for money against nonresident defendant
ruled void under the fourteenth amendment because the only service was
by newspaper publication).
7. Federal jurisdiction follows comparatively similar principles. Service of process in federal actions may be made within the territorial limits of
the state in which the district court sits, or anywhere else that the law of that
state permits. Thus, expansion of in personam jurisdiction in state courts
also embraces the federal court system. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938) (rather than interpret general federal common law, federal
courts must apply the laws of the various states); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)-(f); 4
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1075 (1969 &
Supp. 1980).
8. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as
a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting
rights or interests of nonresident defendants." Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). Due process requires that the defendant be
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court and that he be given adequate notice of the suit. Personal jurisdiction may be exercised when "minimum contacts" exist between the defendant and the forum. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). See generally F.
JAMES &G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 12.1, 12.12 (2d ed. 1977); Hazard, A
General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241; Kurland,
The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569 (1958); notes 13-17, 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
9. D. KARLEN, CIvIL LrrIGATION 153-56 (1978). See note 8 supra.
10. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64 at 302 (3d ed. 1976); 4 C.
WRIGHT &A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1064-1072 (1969

&Supp. 1980). In Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., Inc., 346 U.S. 338, 341
(1953), the Supreme Court acknowledged the impact of the automobile on
the Court since Pennoyer and the need for redress against the possibility of
injury by a motorist in our mobile society. Cf. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S.

235,250-51 (1958) (increase in flow of commerce requires increase in ability

to obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents).
11. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533, 535.
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physical presence at the time of service unnecessary. 12 The
need for change and cohesion evidenced by the common use of
exceptions culminated in the United States Supreme Court decision of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.13
InternationalShoe established the contemporary concept of
"minimum contacts" with the forum as the basis for jurisdiction
over the defendant.' 4 The contacts must have such a substantial
connection with the forum that the "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice" are not offended by maintenance of
the suit.15 Today, its liberal and widespread application is well
7
settled 16 despite subsequent judicial limitations.
Over the last fifteen years, however, concurrent with the
steady growth in state jurisdictional power, a contrary notion re12. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964)
(consent through contractual designation of an in-state agent for service of
process); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (domicile); Henry L. Doherty &Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (doing business); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (prior acts within state as implied consent).
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. The Supreme Court stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."
Id. at 316. Instead of presence, the InternationalShoe Court examined the
character of the nonresident's contacts with the forum and the possible infringement upon fair play of compelling him to defend there. While implicitly recognizing a state's interest in providing a forum for its citizens, as well
as a plaintiffs interest in the availability of greater latitude in the choice of
a forum, the Court focused on the "quality and nature" of the defendant's
contacts. Id. at 319. Accord, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Cf. Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923) (company held
not to be doing business in another state because members merely solicited
new business there).
15. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In discussing the due process aspects of the test, the InternationalShoe Court
acknowledged the possible unreasonableness of defending as a result of the
mere presence of a corporate agent, isolated activities, or suits on causes of
action unrelated to the in-state activity. Id. at 317. InternationalShoe, however, involved a cause of action arising from activities within the state and
the Court stated that the privilege of conducting such activities, in most instances, requires response to suits connected with them. Id. at 319. Contact as minimal as an insurance policy between a state resident and a
nonresident company has been held sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
16. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the departure from the Pennoyer presence-oriented theory of jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977). Shaffer held that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and
its progeny." Id. at 212. See generally Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts:
The Supreme Court's New JurisdictionalTheory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19 (1980);
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33

(1978). The Shaffer pronouncements on jurisdictional standards were re-
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stricting jurisdiction over nonresidents has emerged. 18 This
doctrine, known as the "fiduciary shield,"'19 precludes jurisdiction over an individual when "predicated upon jurisdiction over
cently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320
(1980).
An excellent example of the change from the Pennoyer concept has
been the legislative enactment of "long-arm" statutes allowing state courts
to obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants not within the forum at the
time of service. Some states have purported to extend personal jurisdiction
to the bounds of their constitutional power as liberalized by the minimum
contacts interpretation of due process limitations. Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.
F. 533, 537. "[M]ost state legislatures have enacted such statutes with a
mind to availing plaintiffs of the benefits of InternationalShoe." Sponsler,
Jurisdiction Over the CorporateAgent: The Fiduciary Shield, 35
L. REV. 349, 349 n.2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sponsler].

WASH.

&

LEE

17. E.g., the Supreme Court decision in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958), held that the state court jurisdiction over nonresidents was not without limits. After noting the trend of expanding personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents, the Court stated it was a "mistake to assume that this trend
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction
of state courts." Id. at 251. The Hanson Court held that regardless of the
ease with which a defendant can defend in a forum, there still must be sufficient contacts between him and the forum before a court may compel him
to defend there. Id. The Court ruled a state does not acquire jurisdiction
"by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient
location for litigation. [The issue] is resolved ... by considering the acts of
the [defendant]." Id. at 254.
In Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court
interpreted due process as requiring "systematic and continuous" activity
within the forum as a requisite to compelling a nonresident to defend, when
the cause of action arose elsewhere. Id. at 447-48. The Court in Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), stated that contacts consistent with due process
require, at the very least, a relationship between the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation. Id. at 204, 207 and 209. Commingled with direct references to InternationalShoe, the Court stated:

Mechanical or quantitative evaluations of the defendant's activities in
the forum could not resolve the question of reasonableness ....

Thus,

the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,
rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States .

.

. be-

came the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 204. The Shaffer Court further stated that the related acts of the nonresident must be undertaken in a manner purposefully availing himself of
the benefits and protections of the forum's laws. Id. at 216. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), held that due process
requires a defendant's contacts with the forum be "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. at 297.
18. Sponsler, supra note 16, at 350.
19. The term "fiduciary shield" initially appeared in United States v.
Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919
(1966). Its acceptance as a term of art became more widespread after appearing in Sponsler, supra note 16. See, e.g., Warren v. Dynamics Health
Equip. Mfg. Co., 483 F. Supp. 788 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Grove Press, Inc. v. Central Intelligence Agency, 483 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Barrett v. Bryant,
290 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1980); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer,
86 Wis. 2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
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a corporation. '20 The concept developed from the fear of unfairness in asserting jurisdiction over corporate officers based
merely upon jurisdiction over the corporation itself.2 1 Without
the shield doctrine, every officer of a national corporation could
be subject to personal jurisdiction in every state simply
because
22
the corporation transacted business within the state.
The fiduciary shield doctrine has also been used in determining the personal amenability of corporate agents whose individual contacts with a state satisfy the standards of minimum
contacts analysis. 23 When an agent's contacts on behalf of a corporation place him within the reach of a forum's long-arm statute, 24 the corporate principal may be subject to the jurisdiction
of that state. 25 Under the fiduciary shield doctrine,
however, the
26
agent himself may not be similarly amenable.
20. Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798, 803
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), arfd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975). "It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over an individual cannot be predicated upon jurisdiction over a corporation. That is to say, an individual's transaction of business within the
state solely as an officer of a corporation does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual." Id. at 803-04 (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., Merkel Assoc., Inc. v. Bellowfram Corp., 437 F. Supp. 612,
618 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) ("the purpose of such a 'fiduciary shield' from long-arm
jurisdiction is to protect such corporate officers from unreasonable and unjust subjection to personal jurisdiction, not to protect them from liability").
22. E.g., Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1974) ("If
such suits against officers of national corporations were ever permitted, the
individuals could be sued in every state of the union whenever they make
telephone calls or write letters to a customer. .. ").
23. E.g., Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780 (D.C. Md.
1978) (issue of sufficiency of defendants' contacts need not be considered
since individual defendants' visits to the forum were on corporate business). See Sponsler, supra note 16, at 363.
24. Long-arm statutes are:
legislative acts which provide for personal jurisdiction, via substituted
service of process, over persons or corporations which are nonresidents
of the state and which voluntarily go into the state, directly or by agent,
or communicate with persons in the state, for limited purposes, in actions which concerns claims relating to the performance or execution of
those purposes, e.g.transacting business in the state ....
or selling
goods outside the state when the seller knows that the goods will be
used or consumed in the state.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 849 (5th ed. 1979). See 4 C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1068 (1969 &Supp. 1980). See also note

16 supra.
25. The Illinois long-arm statute illustrates the possibility of asserting

jurisdiction over a corporation or an individual through an agent's activities.

STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (1979). See note 45 infra.
26. While recognizing that individual agents entered the forum and performed acts related to the cause of action, several courts have still declined

ILL. REv.

to assert personal jurisdiction over them. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d

1277 (10th Cir. 1969) (former corporate employee entered forum and alleg-

edly made misrepresentations in a contract bid submitted on behalf of the
principal); Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975), ajfd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975) (individual's trips to the forum
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In interpreting the shield doctrine, courts have generally
held that "an individual's transaction of business within the
state solely as an officer of a corporation does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual. '27 Even when the individual corporate officer enters the forum, courts have apparently
assumed the same possibility of unfairness as where jurisdiction over the officer is based on corporate activity alone. 28 As a
result, the doctrine has frequently been invoked to bar jurisdiction over agents 29 whose contacts otherwise sufficiently satisfy
minimum contacts analysis, when the contacts with the forum
30
are solely on behalf of the corporation.
When an individual's 3 1 activities have clearly satisfied the
minimum contacts standards of International Shoe, a conflict
arises if jurisdiction cannot be acquired because of the fiduciary
shield doctrine. Both concepts are based on fairness, but the
shield doctrine has been allowed to mechanically nullify minimum contacts analysis because the individual's acts were undertaken in a corporate capacity. The conflict is even more
were deemed unrelated to plaintiff's cause of action); Fashion Two Twenty,
Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (business which the individual defendants may have transacted in the forum held transacted in a
corporate agency capacity only); Path Instruments Int'l Corp. v. Asashi Optical Co., 312 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (individual defendant's visits to
the forum found to be in accord with his agency relationship with the principal); Yardis Corp. v. Cirami, 76 Misc.2d 793, 351 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1974) (court refused to enforce judgment entered in another state holding
acts by the individual defendant in the other state were undertaken as an
officer of a nonresident corporation). It appears that when jurisdiction is
sought over corporate agents on an individual basis, and all of their acts
within the forum were solely in a corporate capacity, the corporation will
ordinarily insulate the individuals from the court's personal jurisdiction.

3A

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 1296.1

(rev. perm. ed. 1975 & Supp. 1980); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-

TICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1069 (Supp. 1980). Thus, the fiduciary shield doc-

trine may preclude jurisdiction over a corporate agent even though his

activities are sufficient to subject the corporate principal to a state court's
personal jurisdiction. See note 23 supra.

27. Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798, 804 (S.D.

N.Y. 1975), arfd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975). See notes 20, 26 supra.

28. Sponsler, supra note 16, at 351.
29. The term "agent" includes corporate officers, but an individual need
not hold any special corporate title to fall within the auspices of the fiduciary shield doctrine.
30. See note 26 supra.
31. International Shoe involved a corporate defendant, but evidenced

the intent of the Supreme Court to create a standard applicable to the individual as well as the corporate nonresident. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). This intent was recently affirmed in
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) ("the InternationalShoe Court be-

lieved that the standards it was setting forth governed actions against natural persons as well as corporations."). 433 U.S. at 204 n.19.
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noteworthy in light of the trend of expanding state court jurisdiction over nonresidents.
The discord created by this aspect of the fiduciary shield
doctrine's application was recently addressed by a federal district court in Chancellor v. Lawrence.32 In Chancellor, the
agent's acts within the forum were solely on behalf of the corporation, yet the court declined to apply the fiduciary shield doctrine. 33 In doing so, the court was able to comport with the
jurisdictional standards of InternationalShoe, while questioning the underlying assumptions and mechanical use of the
shield doctrine in all cases involving corporate agents acting on
corporate business. This casenote will analyze the Chancellor
decision and suggest that the rationale used be adopted in future decisions.
FACTS AND HOLDING OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Janice Chancellor, a twelve-year-old ward of the State of Illinois, was placed in the Meridell Achievement Center (MAC), an
incorporated child care complex in Texas. 34 Pursuant to an
ongoing general operating agreement with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, 35 MAC consistently re36
ceived and cared for numerous wards of Illinois.
Approximately six months after her arrival in Texas, Ms. Chancellor underwent surgery. 37 Prior to surgery the MAC staff in32. 501 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. IIl. 1980).
33. Id. at 1003-05.
34. The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Juvenile Division, adjudicated Ms. Chancellor, then twelve years old, a neglected minor and ward of
the state. Subsequently, on June 26, 1970, she was placed in the care of the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (IDCFS). The Guardianship Administrator at IDCFS was appointed her legal guardian. In early
1971, after numerous unsuccessful attempts at placing Ms. Chancellor in
private foster homes, IDCFS placed her at MAC. She arrived at MAC on
April 6, 1971, accompanied by an IDCFS caseworker, who processed her admission and, on behalf of IDCFS, executed an individual placement agreement for her care. Id. at 999.
35. The agreement provided for monthly reimbursement, at a per diem
rate, for the daily care of IDCFS placements during the preceeding month.
Officials from MAC traveled to Illinois at least once every year to renegotiate the per diem rate. Id. at 999, 1002.
36. Records presented to the district court show that during 1971 over
100 IDCFS children were at MAC at any one time. Consequently, IDCFS
paid MAC approximately $800,000 for services rendered during this period.

Id. at 999.

37. In late 1971, after Ms. Chancellor complained of pain, the possible
presence of a calcium "mass" in her abdomen was discovered by MAC's
regular outside pediatrician. She was referred to a surgeon in Austin,
Texas, who detected signs of ovarian "teratoma." Teratoma is a new and
abnormal growth composed of numerous varying kinds of tissue not native
to the location in which it occurs. DoRLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL Dic-
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formed her that she was scheduled for an appendectomy. For
unexplained reasons, her ovaries and uterus were also
removed.3 8
A few months later, unaware of the extent of the operation,
she returned to Illinois and discovered the loss of her procreative capacity. 39 As a result, she brought an action for damages in
the Federal District Court of Illinois. 4° The suit was brought
against various individuals, including former officials from the
Texas corporation (MAC defendants).41 The plaintiff alleged
that she was not properly informed of the purpose and extent of
the surgery.4
A motion to dismiss for lack
filed by the MAC defendants. 43
Illinois for contract negotiations
ences were undertaken strictly

of in personam jurisdiction was
They alleged that their visits to
and to attend child care conferon behalf of the corporation."

TIONARY 1549 (25th ed. 1965). Because of the growth's potential malignancy,
diagnostic surgery and possible removal of the mass was advised. MAC responded by obtaining consent for the necessary procedures from Ms. Chancellor's legal guardian in Illinois. 501 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
38. On November 23, 1971, exploratory surgery revealed a cyst on plaintiff's right ovary. Subsequent pathological analysis showed that the cyst
was benign. 501 F. Supp. at 1000.
39. In May of 1972, Ms. Chancellor was transferred to Chicago State
Hospital, a public mental institution in Illinois. While at the institution, she
was informed that her ovaries and uterus had been removed. Id.
40. Federal subject matter jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1332 and 1343. It was submitted that the court had pendant jurisdiction over
the breach of duty and malpractice claims. Id. at 999.
41. The MAC defendants included a former administrator, a former assistant administrator, and the chief nurse from MAC. Id. at 1000. References to the MAC defendants in this casenote do not include the nurse.
The suit against her was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue. Id. at 1005-06.
42. The underlying controversy was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, breach of
guardianship duties, professional malpractice and medical malpractice.
The six counts alleged were: (1) denial of plaintiff's right to procreate; (2)
denial of due process of law; (3) denial of plaintiff's right to treatment; (4)
breach of guardianship duties; (5) professional malpractice; and (6) medical malpractice. Counts one through three were directed against all defendants. Counts four and five were directed toward former IDCFS officials and
the MAC defendants. Count six was against the physicians. Id. at 999-1000.
This casenote is concerned with the MAC defendants and their motion to
dismiss the counts against them for want of in personam jurisdiction.
43. The nonresident defendants included the physicians who performed
the operation as well as the MAC defendants. Both groups moved for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 1000. The Chancellor opinion included considerable analysis of the jurisdictional issue regarding the
physicians before dismissing the counts against them for lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue. Id. at 1000-02.
44. Both individuals had substantially the same contacts with the forum. Each attended national child care conferences in Illinois. On these
occasions, they both might have met with IDCFS officials to discuss the
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Therefore, they argued that jurisdiction was precluded by operation of the fiduciary shield doctrine. The district court disagreed
amenable to suit under the Illiand found the MAC defendants
45
nois long-arm statute.
The court noted that although the weight of authority was in
the defendants' favor, to automatically follow precedent by applying the doctrine would conflict with the standards of fairness
governing the question of jurisdiction. 46 The court emphasized
the need for a flexible case by case examination of the fairness
standards before exerting jurisdicition. 47 Consequently, the
court held that when the activities of nonresident individuals
are of a nature that would normally subject them to the personal
general status of various IDCFS children placed at MAC. One defendant

may have had telephone conversations with IDCFS employees in Illinois to
arrange these meetings. He also once traveled to Illinois to pick up some
MAC residents who ran away from the center.
The general operating agreement between MAC and IDCFS was signed
and perhaps negotiated by a MAC defendant. Both defendants traveled to
Illinois, at least annually, to renegotiate the daily rate of payment specified
in the contract. One executed the individual agreement pursuant to which
plaintiff was admitted to MAC. Id. at 1002.
45. Because plaintiffs brief was unclear, the Chancellor court presumed
she intended to assert jurisdiction under the "transacting business within
the state" provision of the Illinois long-arm statute. Id. at 1000. Pertinent
provisions of the statute read as follows:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who
in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may be made
by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this
State, as provided in this Act, with the same force and effect as though
summons had been personally served within this State.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him
is based upon this Section.
(4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any
process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 §§ 17(1)(a), 17(2), 17(3), 17(4) (1979).

To determine whether to assert in personam jurisdiction, statutory and
constitutional issues must be considered. Both aspects were considered simultaneously in Chancellor because the legislative intent of the Illinois
long-arm statute is to extend jurisdiction to the limits of due process.
O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1971); Nelson v.
Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
Although personal jurisdiction was allowed, the MAC defendants were
dismissed because of improper venue. Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp.
997, 1006 (N.D. 11l. 1980).
46. 501 F. Supp at 1003.
47. Id.
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jurisdiction of the forum, fairness dictates that jurisdiction
should not be barred merely because the
contacts were perpe48
trated solely on behalf of a corporation.
ANALYSIS

In Chancellor,the court concluded that without the application of the fiduciary shield doctrine the individual defendants
would be subject to in personam jurisdiction. 49 That conclusion
was properly based on the minimum contacts standard of fairness articulated in InternationalShoe°50 These same principles
also guided the Chancellor court to except the fiduciary shield
doctrine.5 1 The court reasoned that, since fairness was the accepted jurisdictional standard, the shield doctrine could not be
allowed to defeat the acquisition of jurisdiction over the MAC
defendants. Thus, it would not be unfair to compel the defendants to defend in Illinois, even though their contacts with the
state were strictly in the interest of a corporation.
The Application of "Minimum Contacts"Analysis

Interpreting the Standard
In holding the MAC defendants subject to the Illinois longarm statute, the Chancellorcourt interpreted the minimum contacts standard as requiring the balancing of the plaintiff's, the
defendant's, and the forum's interests in the suit.5 2 While the

district court was bound to apply the InternationalShoe standard,5 3 judicial history indicates that this standard is subject to
48. Id. at 1005.
49. Id. at 1003.
50. Id. at 1000-03, 1005.
51. Id. at 1003.
52. Id. at 1001. In InternationalShoe, the Court stated that the relationship between the defendant and the forum must make it "reasonable... to
defend the particular suit which is brought there." International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). Implicit in the InternationalShoe
Court's emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the defendant's interest will be considered in light of other relevant factors. These
factors include the "forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute...
the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief ... the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies ... and the shared interests of the several states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies." World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). See generally Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois,
1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533; Nordenberg, State Courts, PersonalJurisdictionand
the Evolutionary Process, 54 NoTRE DAME LAw. 587, 593-613 (1979).
53. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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subtle differences in interpretation. 54 Though the term "minimum contacts" suggests that physical contacts with the forum
are important, many courts have not treated them with much
significance.5 5 Rather, a complex process of balancing various
56
interests relevant to overall fairness has frequently been used.
Among the interests commonly analyzed by courts are the
expectations of the public, procedural convenience and the regulatory concerns of the various states. 57 Such analysis may lead
54. Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdictional
Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 65 (1977).

55. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), a Florida resident willed
part of a trust set up in Delaware to her daughters. A suit over the trust
ensued. Florida was the home of the principal contenders for the money.
The state had an interest in the controversy since the will was probated
there and it was also a reasonably convenient forum for all litigants. The
Court invalidated Florida's assertion of jurisdiction, however, indicating
that the Delaware trustee had insufficient contacts with Florida to submit
itself to Florida jurisdiction. Id. at 251-52. Thus, some courts have apparently understood the InternationalShoe standard as requiring their analysis to focus on each defendant's physical or business connections with the
forum.
56. The emphasis of different factors does not mean that courts have
intentionally followed two different theories in applying the International
Shoe test. Most courts have quoted the same passages from that case. See
note 14 supra. The difference is in the way those passages have been interpreted. Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdictional
Theory? 26 U. KAN.L. REV. 61, 64-65 (1977). See Kamp, Beyond Minimum
Contacts: The Supreme Court's New JurisdictionalTheory, 15 GA. L. REV.

19, 31-32 (1980).
57. In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., a nonresident corporation was subjected to Illinois jurisdiction in a suit for tort damages. The plaintiffs injuries were caused by the failure of a valve which the
defendant corporation manufactured in Ohio. The valve was purchased by
a manufacturer in Pennsylvania and incorporated into a hot water heater.
The boiler was subsequently sold to a consumer inIllinois, where it exploded and injured the plaintiff. Jurisdiction was found by weighing various factors: the Illinois location of the explosion; the lack of inconvenience
to the defendant; the Illinois location of witnesses; the prevalence of Illinois
substantative law; the defendant's knowledge of the product's widespread
distribution; and the defendant's enjoyment of the benefits and protections
2d 432,176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also In-Flight Devices
of Illinois law. 22 Ill.
Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972) (no particular type of
physical contact required as jurisdictional prerequisite); Jack O'Donnell
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (indirect contact
can be as indicative of substantial involvement as a personal visit). For discussions of this jurisdictional approach see generally Ehrenzweig, From
State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 OR. L. REV. 103 (1971);
Ehrenzweig, The TransientRule of PersonalJurisdiction: The "Power"Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956); Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657 (1959). But see Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New JurisdictionalTheory, 15 GA. L.

REV. 19 (1980). Kamp suggests that the Supreme Court decisions in WorldWide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), although reflective of prior judicial analysis,
have created a new approach to jurisdictional theory. Contradicting the
modern state court trend favoring the plaintiff, the new theory looks only to
the relation between the forum and the defendant. Kamp interprets these
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to the proper exercise of jurisdiction when the determinative
factors favor suit within a forum, even if the defendant's connection with the forum is somewhat remote. The Chancellor approach of looking broadly to the fairness of requiring the
defendants to defend in Illinois was a proper interpretation of
the InternationalShoe standard.
The Determinative Factors
The activities of the MAC defendants were sufficient to connect them with the forum and the litigation. 58 In addition, the
state's and plaintiff's interest in Illinois litigation were unusually strong.5 9 Thus, the results of the balancing analysis led to
the determination that personal jurisdiction should be exercised
over the individual defendants. An examination of the court's
reasoning shows that the defendants' visits to Illinois to make
contracts and attend conferences, 60 and plaintiff's status as a
ward of the State of Illinois 6 1 were the determinative factors.
The refusal to allow minimum contacts analysis to be automatically negated by the fiduciary shield theory distinguishes
Chancellor from the majority of cases where the theory has
been considered. When an agent enters a forum and transacts
business in a manner satisfying minimum contacts standards, it
is not unfair to force him to answer for his actions in that forum.
Even though acting officially, the agent has still entered a state's
legitimate sphere of concern and is furthering his own interests
cases as going beyond "minimum contacts" to more closely examine state
sovereignty and considerations of convenience and reasonableness. Thus,
jurisdiction may be denied even if there is little or no inconvenience to the
defendant in the foreign litigation.
58. Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1002-03 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Although the contacts of the individual defendants in Chancellor are arguably
tenuous, it must be remembered that the ultimate jurisdictional ruling was
the result of balancing relevant interests. Therefore, the contacts themselves may be a somewhat secondary factor when weighed against the interests of the parties and the forum. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text
supra. The treatment of the Chancellor considerations on minimum contacts is cursory because the primary concern of this casenote is the conflict
between the results of minimum contacts analysis and prior results through
use of the shield doctrine. It is important to note, however, that the Chancellor analysis of the contacts mentioned all of the restrictions set forth by
the United States Supreme Court. See note 17 supra. Consequently, Chancellor does not stand for the proposition that every agent performing duties
for another within a forum is necessarily subject to that forum's jurisdiction. Rather, the decision shows that when nonresident agents purposefully enter a forum, and thereby invoke its benefits and protections, they
may be subject to that state's jurisdiction in foreseeable litigation related to
such activities.
59. Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1003 (N.D. Mll. 1980).
60. Id. at 1002.
61. Id. at 1003.
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by fulfilling employment responsibilities. The fiduciary shield
doctrine should not be invoked because the purpose for the development of the doctrine-to prevent the unfair assertion of jurisdiction over corporate officers-would not be served under
today's accepted jurisdictional standards.
Excepting the "FiduciaryShield" Doctrine
Having concluded that the MAC defendants performed acts
sufficient to subject them to jurisdiction under the Illinois longarm statute, the Chancellor court next considered the application of the fiduciary shield doctrine. 62 The district court considered the results of its analysis 63 and a court's obligation to
separately examine each fact pattern when ascertaining jurisdictional extent.64 Holding the shield doctrine inapplicable, the
court factually distinguished most of the defendants' cited authority 65 and declined to follow the cases that were apparently
66
apposite.
DistinguishingDivergent Fact Patterns
In distinguishing purported landmark cases supporting the
shield doctrine, 67 the Chancellor court made an elementary, but
critical, statement. The court held that the application of minimum contacts analysis to the distinguished cases revealed that
the contacts between the agents and the forum were alone in62. The Chancellor court first noted the lack of controlling precedent
from the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1004.
The fiduciary shield doctrine has not been adopted by all jurisdictions.
Until it was discussed in Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
1969), the shield theory was only recognized by New York courts. The oriSponsler, supra
note 16.
63. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
64. Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1980). There
is no specific formula or rule of thumb for determining whether there are
sufficient minimum contacts short of ascertaining what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of a particular case. World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Hutter N. Trust v. Door County Chamber

gin and development of the theory is analyzed in detail in

of Commerce, 403 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1968).

65. Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
66. Id. at 1005.
67. The Chancellorcourt stated that many of the cases cited by the defendants were factually distinguishable. To show examples of the differences, the district court specifically discussed the decisions in Weller v.
Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409
F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969); Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato
Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171 (D. Idaho 1976); Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F.
Supp. 997, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 6 8 Therefore, regardless of
whether the individual defendants acted in their own interests
or solely as corporate agents, jurisdiction could not have been
asserted. By distinguishing divergent fact patterns, the Chancellor court recognized the need to treat varying fact patterns differently when deciding whether to apply the fiduciary shield
69
doctrine.
Two principle fact patterns dominate the cases in which the
theory of the fiduciary shield has been discussed. 70 In the first
pattern, the agent himself has insufficient contacts with the forum to sustain jurisdiction. The agent, however, is affiliated
with a corporation that does have the requisite contacts to invoke jurisdiction. 71 The second pattern, where the agent enters
the forum in the interest of the corporation and individually generates contacts sufficient for the state to acquire personal juris72
diction over him is analogous to Chancellor.
The Chancellor court did not feel the second mentioned pattern subjected corporate agents to the same inherent possibility
of unfairness as the first. Courts discussing the fiduciary shield
doctrine have generally not made this distinction. 73 The distinction, however, must be drawn. When an agent enters a forum
for reasons related to the litigation or otherwise acts in a manner subjecting himself to the forum's long-arm statute, regardless of the contacts of the corporate principal, the application of
the shield doctrine would create a situation anomalous to contemporary policy. The mechanical application of the shield doctrine, based on corporate status, allows nonresident agents to
enter a state and significantly affect the lives of citizens therein,
knowing that the state could not force them to remain and answer for their actions should a conflict arise.
68. The Chancellor court stated that Weller and Idaho were distinguishable because there the individual defendants did not enter the forum. Wilshire was distinguished because its holding was partially based on a lack of
nexus between the individual defendants' contacts with the forum and the
litigation. 501 F. Supp. at 1004.
69. Sponsler suggests that judicial analysis in cases discussing the
fiduciary shield has generally been deficient in treating divergent fact patterns alike. He contends that unthinking reliance on prior case law has
caused the doctrine to be applied in situations where the facts would not
allow the assertion of jurisdiction under minimum contacts analysis. Consequently, a theory conflicting with existing minimum contacts standards
has developed. Sponsler, supra note 16, at 350-62.
70. Id. at 350-51.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 351.
73. Id. at 361-62.
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Failure to Critically Examine Prior Case Law
The recognition of the need to distinguish disparate factual
situations makes Chancellor significant. A closer comparison of
prior cases, however, indicates that these previous decisions
were not as inconsistent with the district court's rationale as its
opinion might imply. The Chancellor court specifically labeled
Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co. ,74 Idaho Potato Commission v. Washington Potato Commission75 and Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe 76 as
"ill-suited" precedent because the contacts of the individual defendants were alone insufficient to confer jurisdiction. 77 The
Chancellor court should have gone farther and pointed out the
significance of the minimum contacts analysis discussed in each
of those decisions. Had it done so, the district court could have
raised serious doubt as to the actual basis for the Weller, Idaho
and Wilshire holdings. Simultaneously, the Chancellor rationale of using the InternationalShoe fairness test as grounds for
creating an exception to the fiduciary shield doctrine would
have been supported. The Chancellor court, however, was content with factual distinctions in lieu of critical examination and
discussion, thereby demonstrating a probable unwillingness to
directly challenge the appropriateness of the shield doctrine's
prior use.
Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co. was a breach of contract and antitrust action brought against a nonresident corporation and two
of its officers. The plaintiff claimed that the individual defendants made false representations to him in telephone conversations and in advertising literature sent through the mail. There
was no evidence that the individual defendants committed any
act or omission within the forum. The corporation, however,
was transacting business in the forum through authorized
agents.
Weller reveals that its decision was actually based on the
unreasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over nonresident in78
dividuals who committed no act or omission within the forum.
74. 504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974).

75. 410 F. Supp. 171 (D. Idaho 1976).
76. 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969).
77. See note 68 supra.
78. The Weller court stated:
There was no evidence that the individual defendants committed any
act or omission in the state ... which injured the plaintiff.
We have serious doubt whether the activities of the corporate officers
are sufficient so as to make it reasonable and just, consistent with
traditional notions of fair play, and in conformity with due process requirements ... that the individuals be subjected to suit in [the forum]
arising out of such activities.
Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Realizing the tenuousness of the contacts between the corporate
officers and the forum, the Weller plaintiff based his main argument on the theory that other corporate agents acting within the
79
forum were the personal agents of the absent defendants.
This argument failed. 80 The fairness of compelling the officers to
defend in the forum was determined by examining their individual contacts with the state.8 1 The Weller court cited the general
language of the fiduciary shield doctrine, but actually decided
the case through use of minimum contacts analysis. Thus, jurisdiction might have been asserted if the defendants had acted in
a manner reasonably placing them within the reach of the forum's long-arm statute.
In Idaho Potato Commission v. Washington Potato Commission, an Idaho state agency sued a Washington state agency for
trademark infringement. The plaintiff attempted to secure jurisdiction by way of an advertising scheme employed by the defendants in Idaho. The Idaho holding emphasized that the
defendant's activities were outside the forum. 82 Furthermore,
the court doubted whether the individual corporate directors
reasonably could have anticipated their activities would render
them amenable to suit in another state. 83 The opinion also
posed a hypothetical situation where personal jurisdiction
would be acquired over both a nonresident truck driver and his
employer for the tort of the driver while in the forum. 84 The
court's analysis of the defendants' expectations and the truck
hypothetical indicates that the results in Idaho might have been
reversed had the individual defendants entered the forum.85 Although conceding the inability to conceptually distinguish the
truck hypothetical, 86 the court nevertheless cited the broad lan79. Id. it 930.
80. Id.
81. See note 78 supra.

82. Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp.
171, 182 (D. Idaho 1976).
83. This was due to the defendants' knowledge of and reliance on a
Washington statute indicating that liability flowing from their performance
as directors would be deemed that of the Commission. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Sponsler, supra note 16, at 358-59.
86. The court stated:
Conceptually, it is difficult to distinguish the facts in this case from the
...hypothetical factual situation.
[The resulting liability from the truck driver's act] flows from the commission of a tortious act within the purview of [the forum's] long-arm
statute. Comparing the facts of this case with the hypothetical... both
the members and [the truck driver] can be said to have committed acts
from which a cause of action has arisen.
Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171, 182
(D. Idaho 1976).
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guage of the fiduciary shield doctrine. 87 Consequently, the holding has frequently been interpreted to mean that activities
solely on behalf of a corporation preclude jurisdiction over corporate agents, regardless of whether their contacts with the forum would alone support jurisdiction.
Idaho was actually decided through the use of minimum
contacts analysis and not the fiduciary shield doctrine.8 8 The individual defendants could not anticipate suit in the forum and
therefore, in fairness, the court could not compel them to defend
there.8 9 Jurisdiction might have been consistent with due process had the Idaho defendants entered the forum and availed
themselves of the benefits and protections of state law. Hence,
the Chancellor logic was consistent with Idaho.
An examination of Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle also reveals that
this decision was not based solely on the application of the
fiduciary shield doctrine. 90 Wilshire Oil Company brought an
action against three former employees to recover expenditures
incurred in antitrust litigation caused by the actions of the employees. The individual defendants did enter the forum, but
solely on corporate business. Although the shield theory of immunity was recognized, 91 the court was not clear as to whether a
lack of connection between the defendants' contacts with the forum and the litigation, the fiduciary shield doctrine, or a combination of the two, was responsible for the ruling to preclude the
92
exercise of jurisdiction.
The Chancellor court made no mention of any ambiguity in
Wilshire. A footnote in the Chancellor decision, however, questioned the widespread use of Wilshire as precedent supporting
87. Id. at 180-81.
88. See notes 82-86 and accompanying text supra.
89. Id.
90. Sponsler, supra note 16, at 357.
91. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 1969).
92. The court held:
Thus, our previous discussion of the fiduciary shield precluding an exercise of personal jurisdiction over a corporate agent applies with equal
force here. Nonetheless, we do not deem it necessary to decide the
matter solely on that basis. The interaction of the inherent weakness of
the contacts and the strained causal connection with the underlying
cause of action, operates in conjunction with the fact of the agency relationship to require, in conformity with notions of fair play and substantial justice, that this court refrain from compelling a corporate officer to
answer in courts located in a state foreign to both the agent and his
corporation.
Id. at 1282-83.
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the shield doctrine. 93 Tentative language addressing the fiduciary shield doctrine was pointed out,94 but limited treatment of

this issue in a footnote suggests the Chancellor court's unwillingness to examine and directly challenge cases cited in favor of
the jurisdictional shield.
While the scrutiny and challenge of early cases often cited
as supporting the fiduciary shield theory may have seemed unnecessary in Chancellor,the need for courts to do so is apparent
in light of the foregoing analysis and modern jurisdictional policy. Recognizing, as the Chancellor court did, that the mechanical application of the shield doctrine's broad language can lead
to injustice, 95 courts must insure that it is applied only in the
proper context. The Chancellor court was presented with such
an opportunity but avoided the issue.
Failureto Follow Appropriate Authority
The Chancellor court declined to follow cases it was unable
to distinguish. 96 In prior cases, courts shielded individual de93. Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1004-05 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
94. In its discussion of Quinn v. Bowman Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp.
780 (D.C. Md. 1978), the Chancellor court stated:
The Quinn case is one of many which cite to Wilshire Oil .

.

. for the

proposition at issue here ....
[T]he Court is not convinced that Wilshire Oil is as strong a precedent as one might be led to believe from
the subsequent reliance on the case by other courts. Although Wilshire
Oil cited other cases applying the rule, 409 F.2d at 1281, n.8, the court
never actually decided the issue, but, rather, based its decision on other
grounds. The court stated:
Furthermore, the signing of the bid form, and for that matter the attendance at the various maintenance lettings, were the acts of Homer
Rifle as a corporate employee. As such they were not his personal acts
and seemingly cannot constitute the transaction of business by Homer
Rifle as an individual. .

.

. In any event, it is clear that Wilshire has

failed to prove a sufficient nexus between the submission of the bid and
its claim against Homer Rifle. 409 F.2d at 1281 (emphasis in original).
501 F. Supp. at 1004-05 n.4.
Sponsler also interpreted the Wilshire treatment of the fiduciary shield
doctrine as tentative. Rather than refer to the matter as "settled," the Wilshire court stated in a footnote that "it has been held that" the doctrine
shall preclude jurisdiction. Sponsler, supra note 16, at 357.
95. As expressed in Chancellor:
A mechanistic application of the rule defendants suggest would,
moreover, lead to the anomoly of a corporation being amenable to the
jurisdiction of a foreign forum solely due to the egregious conduct of an

employee in that forum, while the perpetrator of the wrong is insulated
from suit in that jurisdiction. The due process clause does not so
require.

Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
96. Id. at 1004. Chancellor specifically discussed the apparent applicability of Quinn v. Bowman Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780 (D.C. Md. 1978);
Path Instruments Int'l Corp. v. Asahi Optical Co., 312 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). Id. at 1004.
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fendants from jurisdiction even though they entered the forum
on business matters connected with the litigation, and as in
Chancellor, acted only in a corporation's interests. 97 Instead of
mechanically following these cases, the Chancellor court properly decided that due process would not be violated by compelling the MAC defendants to defend in Illinois since jurisdiction
and not merely upon jurisdiction
was based on their activities
98
over the corporation.
Analysis of the development of the shield doctrine casts
suspicion on the soundness of decisions invoking its use.99 Generally, no distinction has been made between the fact pattern in
which a corporate agent enters the forum and one in which he
does not. 100 Modern jurisdictional policy requires a distinction
be made. Compliance with existing jurisdictional standards
should prohibit use of the shield doctrine in situations where
state jurisdictional power would normally be exercised over the
individual.
In situations like Chancellor, the need for applying the
fiduciary shield doctrine disappears. The purpose of the jurisdictional shield is to prevent a violation of due process through
the unfair assertion of jurisdiction over an individual, based
only on corporate contacts with the forum. 10 1 When circumstances present no danger of unfairness to a defendant and
therefore no possibility of violating due process, there is no need
for individual immunity. In such circumstances the purpose of
the shield doctrine would not be served, and its application
could be unfair to the plaintiff by denying him the opportunity
to sue the wrongdoer in a state where the wrong occurred.
97. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra.
98. Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (N.D. I. 1980). The
district court held that the interests of the state and the forum in the suit
"strongly militate in favor of sustaining jurisdiction." Id. The court further
held:
[Defendants'] contacts with Illinois are sufficiently extensive and amply related to plaintiff's cause of action so that if they were taken in
their personal capacities there would be no question but that these individuals are amenable to suit in Illinois. [Therefore,] if substantial
justice and fundamental fairness is the standard, the Court cannot accept the conclusion that the mere fact that the defendants' actions were
taken in their corporate rather than individual capacities must alter the
result.
Id.

99. See notes 68-94 and accompanying text supra. Courts have "generally failed to differentiate between the issue of substantive liability and the
issue of personal jurisdiction." Warren v. Dynamics Health Equip. Mfg. Co.,
483 F. Supp. 788, 791 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
100. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
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In view of the inability to distinguish all of the authority
supporting the shield doctrine, the Chancellor court should have
indicated that jurisdictions recognizing the immunity provided
by the doctrine have also recognized exceptions to it. 10 2 Courts

willing to disregard the shield doctrine and exercise personal jurisdiction over the corporate agent have generally done so on
"grounds of fundamental equity and fairness.' 1 °3 Therefore,
Chancellor, at the very least, should have acknowledged that
fiduciary shield immunity was penetrable under certain circumstances. Once acknowledged, the court should have then drawn
a favorable analogy.
The approach of first citing other exceptions to the doctrine,
as a prelude to the possible creation of another exception, was
recently taken by a Tennessee federal district court in Warren v.
Dynamics Health Equipment Manufacturing Co. 104 Warren is
significant for its adoption of a new, modified statement of the
102. Like Chancellor, other courts have refused to apply the doctrine
when it would automatically negate the normal outcome of jurisdictional
analysis. See, e.g., Costin v. Olen, 449 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971); Topik v. Catalyst Research Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Md. 1972), afd, 473 F.2d 907 (4th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Maternity Trousseau, Inc. v. Maternity Mart, 196 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1961); Simmons v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
295 So. 2d 550 (Ct. App. La. 1974), writ denied, resultfound to be correct, 229
So. 2d 795 (Sup. Ct. La. 1974).
Exceptions to corporate immunity are generally allowed on the alter
ego theory. The theory attaches liability to the defendant who has used the

corporate form as a means of conducting personal business affairs. Liability is based on the fraud perpetuated on outside parties doing business with
the corporation. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 71 (5th ed. 1979). As a result, the
corporate shield may be excepted. See, e.g., Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979
(5th Cir. 1974) (individual defendant owned or controlled the corporation);
United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 919 (1966) (if the defendant acted in a fraudulent or crinnal manner); Krause v. Hauser, 272 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (if an individual
acts in his own interest rather than that of the corporation).
Some courts have even asserted jurisdiction over the agent predicated
merely upon jurisdiction over the corporation. See House of Koscot Dev.
Corp. v. American Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1972) (individual corporate owners used the corporation as their personal agent to transact business within the forum); Holfield v. Power Chem. Co., 382 F. Supp.
388 (D. Md. 1974) (interests of the corporation and the individual were identical); Country Maid, Inc. v. Haseotes, 299 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (corporate form was not adequately maintained); Odell v. Singer, 169 So. 2d 851
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1964) (tortious corporate activity was attributable to the
defendant personally).
103. Warren v. Dynamics Health Equip. Mfg. Co., 483 F. Supp. 788, 792

(M.D. Tenn. 1980).
104. 483 F. Supp. 788 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). In Warren, the court discussed
various exceptions to the fiduciary shield doctrine before ruling that, without other factors supporting the disregard of the corporate shield, the mere
fact that an individual owned all or almost all of the stock did not compel
such action. 483 F. Supp. at 792.
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fiduciary shield doctrine as noted by modern commentators. 10 5
The court in Warren defined the shield doctrine as one "which
holds that jurisdiction over the individual officers and employees of a corporation may not be predicated merely upon jurisdiction over the corporation absent activities by the individuals
sufficient to subject them to a state's long arm.' 0 6 As a result,
Chancellorcould become part of the foundation for a new line of
case law compelling the reexamination and limitation of the
fiduciary shield theory.
CONCLUSION

Chancellor illustrates the possible conflict between results
obtained by minimum contacts analysis and the results obtained through the mechanical application of the fiduciary
shield doctrine. The consequent inability to systematically apply minimum contacts standards creates the danger of inconsistent and unfair judicial decisions. While the total demise of the
shield doctrine is undesirable, Chancellor indicates the need for
modification.
The holding in Chancellor is significant because it creates
doubt as to the appropriateness of the shield doctrine's prior use
and interpretation. The decision's impact, however, remains
questionable because courts have traditionally been reluctant to
create exceptions to fiduciary shield immunity.10 7 Consequently, a sizable body of case law allowing the individual agent
to be subject to personal jurisdiction has not evolved.10 8
Perhaps the Chancellor court was outraged by a disturbing
and embarassing factual situation and sought to extend maximum protection to a resident plaintiff. The unique facts, 10 9 coupled with the lack of force of the court's pronouncements on
jurisdiction," 0 could make the decision best viewed as one of
policy. Hence, the Chancellor holding could be tantamount to
saying that it is the policy of this court, in this situation, not to
permit the fiduciary shield doctrine to mechanically nullify min105. See, e.g., 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
§ 1069 (Supp. 1980); Sponsler, supra note 16.

PRACTICE AND PROCE-

DURE

106. Warren v. Dynamics Health Equip. Mfg. Co., 483 F. Supp. 788, 791
(M.D. Tenn. 1980) (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 793.

108. Id.

109. See notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
110. In Chancellor the MAC defendants filed a motion to dismiss based
on both jurisdictional and venue objections. The district court decided both
issues in the same opinion. After engaging in an elaborate discussion of the
jurisdictional aspects that led to writing this casenote, the court swiftly nullified the assertion of jurisdiction by holding that the requirements for federal venue were not satisfied. See note 45 supra.
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imum contacts analysis. Despite such an interpretation, the
questions raised by the district court should cause other courts
to reevaluate the use of the shield doctrine. As a result, nonresident corporate agents, who once enjoyed the jurisdictional
shield that acting officially provided, could now find themselves
less immune to suit.
Gregory A. Crouse

